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	<title>Joseph Fan - China Business Knowledge</title>
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		<title>Do Collectivist Cultures Spawn Family Businesses?</title>
		<link>https://cbk.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/do-collectivist-cultures-spawn-family-businesses/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Putro]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Oct 2021 02:00:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Family Business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese culture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese family business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[collectivism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[collectivistic orientation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[family business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[family ownership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fan Joseph]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Joseph Fan]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cbk.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/?p=6561</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>CUHK research finds that company founders who were born into collectivist cultures are likely to hire more family members as managers, retain more company control within the family and share firm ownership with more family members</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://cbk.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/do-collectivist-cultures-spawn-family-businesses/">Do Collectivist Cultures Spawn Family Businesses?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://cbk.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk">China Business Knowledge</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3 class="article__heading__content">CUHK research finds that company founders who were born into collectivist cultures are likely to hire more family members as managers, retain more company control within the family and share firm ownership with more family members</h3>
<p class="article_author">By <a href="mailto:cbk@baf.cuhk.edu.hk">Jaymee Ng</a>, Principal Writer, China Business Knowledge@CUHK</p>
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<p class="article__paragraph">Since its humble beginnings in the wake of the economic reforms and opening up enacted by the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping more than three decades ago, family businesses have grown to become the back bone of China’s economic growth. In China, family firms contributed to about 60 percent of the country’s GDP and hiring 80 percent of the workforce, according to professional services firm <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3839978">EY</a>. But what makes these family firms tick and under what conditions do they prosper? It is with these questions in mind that a recent research study in China examines the effect of culture on family firms and finds their formation (and subsequent prevalence) tend to be boosted by societies that are more collectivist in nature.</p>
<p>The study <em><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3839978">Collectivist Cultures and the Emergence of Family Firms</a></em> sought to look at how the level of collectivism in Chinese society affected the degree to which the first generational founder of a company was willing to spread ownership of their businesses among family members as well as employ them as managers and in senior executive positions. In general, collectivist cultures have a strong emphasis on group achievements and the decisions are often made in the best interest of the group. Individualist cultures, on the other hand, focus on personal goals and benefits. The research was co-conducted by <a href="https://www.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/staff/fan-joseph-p-h/">Joseph Fan</a>, Professor of the School of Accountancy and Department of Finance at The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK), Dr. Gu Qiankun at Wuhan University and Dr. Yu Xin at the University of Queensland.</p>
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<p>Combing through information on 1,103 private firms that went public in China from 2004 to 2016, the researchers compared the birthplace of their company founders with data on share ownership by other family members as well as the number of family members who take up managerial roles within the organisation. They concluded that company founders who hail from a stronger collectivistic cultural background tend to hire more family members as managers, maintain more company ownership within their families, and they may share the controlling ownership with more family members.</p>
<blockquote>
<p><span class="quote quote--left">“</span>In a collectivist society, family guidance helps to serve as an effective force for governance within an organisation.<span class="quote">”</span></p>
<p><cite>Prof. Joseph Fan</cite></p></blockquote>
<p>In coming to this conclusion, the researchers leveraged on the so-called “rice theory” of culture. “It is no secret that China has a strong collectivist cultural history. But, what’s more interesting is that how ‘tight-knit’ the family is actually depends on what they eat,” Prof. Fan says.</p>
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<h2>‘Rice Theory’ of Culture</h2>
<p>Since ancient times, people in northern China grew wheat, while those in southern China farmed paddy rice. Rice farming requires coordinated irrigation and shared labour among farmers, which likely led to a more interdependent culture in the rice farming regions. However, such farming arrangement is not required in wheat-farming regions and therefore, it was theorised wheat farmers are more individualistic when compared with rice farmers. Studies have also demonstrated that this disparity in culture between rice and wheat farming have extended far beyond the farming community and to those who were born and raised in those regions.</p>
<p>The sample used in the study includes private firms in 31 provinces in China, and more than half of them located in Guangdong, Zhejiang and Jiangsu, which belong to the rice farming regions. Coincidentally, most of the founders in the sample were also born in these three provinces.</p>
<figure class="left" data-aos="fade-right">
<div class="img-container"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" src="/wp-content/uploads/iStock-109724079.jpg" alt="" width="2000" height="1323" /></div><figcaption> Rice farming requires coordinated irrigation and shared labour among farmers, which likely led to a more interdependent culture in the rice farming regions.</figcaption></figure>
<p>The results show that founders who hail from the rice farming regions involved more family members (whether that be through ownership or management) by 16.24 percent than those who were from wheat regions. Company founders who were influenced by rice farming culture also owned on average 10.38 percent more in their firms (either through direct shareholdings or through family ownership) but this was more spread out over their family members by 11.58 percent. In addition, a one standard deviation increase in rice culture influence was linked to a 5.32 percent increase in family ownership and a 5.93 percent decrease in ownership concentration within the family.</p>
<p>“They say that the family that plays together stays together. The stronger the collectivistic influence on the founders, the more likely that they would share their firm ownership with more family members,” Prof. Fan says. “We think that in a collectivist society, family guidance helps to serve as an effective force for governance within an organisation.”</p>
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<div class="clearfix">
<h2>Family Governance</h2>
<p>Prof. Fan explains that in a collectivist culture, which puts the group’s benefits above everything, values are learned and shared by family members and further strengthened by familial interactions. The family of a company founder, in getting involved in the business, can potentially serve as a corporate governance force because their unique and close relationship between members can provide discipline for the company, improve the sharing of information and knowledge and reduce the effort needed in communication and monitoring activities.</p>
<p>As a result, the researchers believe that firms managed by families can benefit from lower corporate governance costs compared to their non-family-run counterparts, and the same would hold true in that the governance costs of firms would be lower in those regions influenced by collectivist cultures as opposed to those that were influenced by individualist cultures.</p>
<figure class="right" data-aos="fade-left">
<div class="img-container"><img decoding="async" src="/wp-content/uploads/iStock-511808998.jpg" alt="" width="1259" height="833" /></div><figcaption> The stronger the collectivistic influence on the founders, the more likely that they would share their firm ownership with more family members, the research finds.</figcaption></figure>
<p>“Since a higher level of family ownership and management is associated with a lower governance cost, it makes sense for the founders who were born into a collectivist cultural background to involve their family members more,” Prof. Fan comments, adding that it is the birthplace culture of the founders, rather than the cultures of where they usually work in or reside, that has the strongest impact.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the researchers also considered the possibility that Confucian values, which is also deeply rooted in Chinese culture, could be at play in the formation of family businesses. In fact, rice growing regions are also typically heavily influenced by Confucian culture. For instance, Shandong province – the hometown of Confucius, is also famous for its rice. Prof. Fan and his co-authors also took this possibility into concern. However, after doing several rounds of additional tests, they did not find any evidence that supported the role of the Confucian values in the formation of family businesses.</p>
<p><strong>Firm Characteristics</strong></p>
<p>According to the study, companies in the traditional manufacturing and trading sectors, such as metal materials, timber and furniture, and wholesale, engage the highest number of family members through either ownership or management. Businesses in the machinery sector, as well as the information technology sector involve significantly more founding family members if they come from a collectivist culture compared to those from individualist cultures. Prof. Fan says this may indicate the corporate governance costs and benefits of collectivist cultures may vary depending on the industry.</p>
<p>Companies with a larger size are also more likely to have more founding family members and more family owners. However, founders with higher education levels and those firms with more leverage are less likely to involve family members in their business operations, but they are more willing to share ownership with their family members.</p>
<div class="article__related">
<div class="article__related__label">RELATED ARTICLE</div>
<p><a href="/how-chinese-firms-are-benefiting-from-family-ownership/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">How Chinese Firms are Benefitting From Family Ownership</a></div>
<p>As their current research has already established a strong relationship between collectivist cultures and the establishment of family businesses, Prof. Fan and his co-authors expect future research studies to further expand the scope of the roles of culture in governing other stakeholder relationships.</p>
<p>“Do founders from a collectivist cultural background compensate their managers with less emphasis on monetary rewards while individualist business owners tend to give their staff more incentive compensation that’s in line with the market? Or, when faced with uncertainties, will the former be more conservative while the latter is more willing to take risks? These questions are worth exploring in the future,” Prof. Fan adds.</p>
</div><p>The post <a href="https://cbk.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/do-collectivist-cultures-spawn-family-businesses/">Do Collectivist Cultures Spawn Family Businesses?</a> first appeared on <a href="https://cbk.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk">China Business Knowledge</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>How Chinese Firms are Benefitting From Family Ownership</title>
		<link>https://cbk.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/how-chinese-firms-are-benefiting-from-family-ownership/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Putro]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2020 02:00:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Family Business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese family business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[corporate governance in China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[family business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[family management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[family ownership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Joseph Fan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prof. Joseph Fan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[related party transactions]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://cbk.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/?p=4797</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>New CUHK research finds managerial participation by family members linked to fewer problematic transactions.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://cbk.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/how-chinese-firms-are-benefiting-from-family-ownership/">How Chinese Firms are Benefitting From Family Ownership</a> first appeared on <a href="https://cbk.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk">China Business Knowledge</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3 class="article__heading__content">New CUHK research finds managerial participation by family members linked to fewer problematic transactions</h3>
<p class="article_author">By <a href="mailto:cbk@baf.cuhk.edu.hk">Jaymee Ng</a>, Principal Writer, China Business Knowledge @ CUHK</p>
<p class="article__paragraph">Family ownership in modern corporations – despite being highly commonplace with household names such as Walmart, Volkswagen and Ford being high profile family-controlled examples in the West – has a bad reputation in emerging markets. Critics often argue that family managers often underperform their professional counterparts, and if they make unpopular decisions, it is often passed off as self-serving behaviour or made at the expense of public investors.</p>
<p>Contrary to this view that family-owned businesses carry substantial governance burden, new research by The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) Business School has found that among Chinese family-owned businesses, those with high family member involvement in management typically engage in fewer problematic transactions, benefitting minority shareholders in the process.</p>
<blockquote>
<p><span class="quote quote--left">“</span>We find a higher degree of controlling family participation and more diffusion of firm cashflow and decision rights within the family is associated with fewer related-party transactions that are suspected of minority exploitation.<span class="quote">”</span></p>
<p><cite>Prof. Joseph Fan</cite></p></blockquote>
<p>Entitled <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3488539">Controlling Family and Corporate Governance,</a> the study was conducted by <a href="https://www.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/staff/fan-joseph-p-h/">Joseph Fan</a>, Professor at the School of Accountancy and Department of Finance at CUHK Business School in collaboration with Dr. Xin Yu, Senior Lecturer at The University of Queensland Business School.</p>
<p>Examining more than 1,200 emerging Chinese publicly-traded private sector firms, Prof. Fan and his collaborator looked at whether and how the partition and allocation of ownership rights within a firm’s controlling families enhances or weakens corporate governance from both the controlling owners and public investors’ perspective.</p>
<p><strong>In-house Conflicts</strong></p>
<p>The study divided conflicts within family owned businesses into three types. The first two types are widely recognised; they consist of conflict of interest between owners and managers, and that between the controlling family and minority shareholders. The researchers argued that a third type of conflict may arise as the family size grows and ownership rights spread among family members. For example, a self-interested family member may tunnel away firm resources at the expense of other family members.</p>
<p>Recognising these conflicts, the researchers then went on to examine whether the level of managerial participation by family members led to more or fewer related-party transactions – including acquisitions of assets, sales of assets, and trade of goods and services between a listed firm and a connected party, sales of equity from a listed firm to a connected party, and cash payment from a listed firm to a connected party.</p>
<p>These transactions are generally considered highly prone to conflicts of interest. The idea is that if family involvement in business is a symptom of weak governance and rent extraction, higher family participation should be associated with more pervasive related-party transactions suspected of expropriation, and vice versa, Prof. Fan explains.</p>
<div class="article__related">
<div class="article__related__label">RELATED ARTICLE</div>
<p><a href="https://www.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/featured-stories/do-asian-family-businesses-destroy-themselves-2/">Do Asian Family Businesses Destroy Themselves?</a></div>
<p>“We find a higher degree of controlling family participation and more diffusion of firm cashflow and decision rights within the family is associated with fewer related-party transactions that are suspected of minority exploitation,” Prof. Fan says. In addition, the association between family participation and suspicious related-party transactions was more pronounced among firms subject to weaker market governance. The study also found that suspicious related-party transactions were fewer when more family members were both owners and managers.</p>
<p>“During our sample period, a change in government regulation occurred that aimed to curtail related-party loans of publicly traded companies. We find that controlling family participation mitigates related-party loans pre-regulation, but the effects disappear after the regulatory enforcement, again suggesting that controlling family participation in firms has been an important private governance mechanism that substitutes for the prior weak public governance,” says Prof. Fan.</p>
<p><strong>Spillover Benefits</strong></p>
<p>Prof. Fan says the findings were consistent with the theory that family businesses typically implement measures to align the interest and incentive of individual family members and to mitigate in-house conflicts, and that these governance measures often “spillover” to benefit other shareholders. However, the results also reveal that the family governance effects are weaker if family managers do not own shares, and even disappear if family owners do not serve as managers.</p>
<p>The governance effects are stronger when more siblings and parents of founders participate in the firms, while more children participation weakens the effects. Prof. Fan explains that this gels with the fact that in many cultures, the founder of a family business is more likely to have their decision making questioned by senior family members, rather than their children.</p>
<p>While participation by the spouse of a company’s founder was not associated with more suspicious related-party transactions, participation by more distant relatives was associated with substantially fewer such dealings. This squares with the view that family goals and values diverge and trust dissipates the farther apart family relatedness becomes. Hence, less close members of the family are more incentivised to monitor the business.</p>
<p>Speaking of future research, Prof. Fan admits much work remains. “These results suggest that both ownership incentive and monitoring ability matter to the effectiveness of family governance, in contrast to the negative and perhaps dominating view that controlling families are prone to conflicts with public minority investors,” says Prof. Fan. “However, we have yet to explore specific family governance mechanisms beyond family ownership and management that induce family incentives and mitigate conflicts of controlling family members. More research into this topic is warranted.”</p><p>The post <a href="https://cbk.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/how-chinese-firms-are-benefiting-from-family-ownership/">How Chinese Firms are Benefitting From Family Ownership</a> first appeared on <a href="https://cbk.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk">China Business Knowledge</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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